| East Timor and Indonesia 1975-1999:
A History of Realism in Our Time
†
October 2006
In investigating the history of East
Timor we will discover how this territory is central to the paradigm
of realism in relation to Indonesia. Issues of power and control
are the hallmarks of realism and are made practical by gaining and
controlling territory. This is predominantly provided by military
action, or the threat of such force. Likewise resources are seized
and strategic benefits of geography are both enhanced and reinforced.
These combining factors will present a historical case for Indonesia’s
interest in what has recently become the youngest independent state
in the world.
Most recent history can be summarised
with the Portuguese withdrawal from East Timor in 1975. Indonesia
took this as a cue to invade the territory. The Treaty of Lisbon
in 1859 had eventually found East Timor a colony of Portugal in
1896. When the Portuguese withdrew from the territory in 1975, Indonesia
stepped in to annex East Timor in 1976 after the Revolutionary Front
for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) declared independence in
November.
“On 7 December 1975, just
10 days after East Timor declared independence, Indonesia launched
a combined military, naval and airborne invasion of East Timor
[…] Along with the capture of Dili came massacres, wholesale
looting, rape and indiscriminate destruction, setting the pattern
of conduct for the Indonesian armed forces over the next 24 years.”
Martinkus goes on to summarise these atrocities:
“A third of East Timorese had perished
by the early 1990s as a direct result of the Indonesian military’s
efforts to secure the island. […] More than 250,000 had
died. This was the highest per capita death toll of any conflict
in the 20th century.”
In discussing the principles of realism from the
Indonesian perspective some understanding of the causes, with such
extreme consequences, shall be revealed.
The reasons for this invasion are best defined
by the paradigm of realism. Justification comes in classic terms,
in the nature of power, generated primarily via territory, resources
and strategy through the application of power. Culture and Indonesia’s
relations with other nations have also had a great influence in
the fate of East Timor. Each will be analysed in turn to support
the realism hypothesis. First though, realism must be clarified
in terms of the aforementioned use of power.
Goldstein says:
“Power is often defined as the ability
to get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done.”
Power is exerted most blatantly by military force.
When considering a state such as Indonesia with the world’s
forth-largest population movement against a small territory like
East Timor, the dominant power becomes obvious. Given this and a
desire to control what Indonesia considers to be part of their extensive
archipelago the state’s direction becomes self-evident. In
order to better understand stakes for this tiny part of the world
at the bottom of Asia we must first look at the history to gain
a contextual understanding of the prevailing issues.
Throughout Indonesia Bahasa was chosen as the language
of national unity. Being that Timor people speak this language this
was one issue upon cultural grounds for the territory being part
of the greater Indonesian state. The territorial claim comes from
the historical reference as East Timor being an integral part of
Indonesia, specified in the 1920s. This was passed into law in July
1976, East Timor being incorporated into the State of Indonesia
as its 27th province.
Much of West Timor is made up of Malay originated
peoples, which is the majority of Indonesians. East Timor holds
a mixed population along with Papuans, and the greatest majority
of the Papuan peoples are in the most eastern part of East Timor.
From this we can see the strength of the pro-Indonesian West, but
also the stronger sense for independence the further east one goes.
Operasi Komodo (Operation Komodo) serves an extreme
example of cultural reasoning for imposing control of East Timor
by the Indonesian military. “Indonesian troops had been given
orders to crush all opposition ruthlessly, and where told that they
were fighting communists in the cause of Jihad (Holy War), just
as they had done in Indonesia in 1965. The Timorese were portrayed
as backward, primitive, almost subhuman.” These kinds of cultural
grounds are significant and have had powerful influences in contemporary
times, including the Balkans, Rwanda and Iraq to name a few.
East Timor territory consists of the eastern portion
of Timor and includes Atauro and Jaco Islands and also the region
of Oecussi, an enclave in the western part of greater Timor. From
a geographical perspective also, territory can be seen as within
the Indian Ocean up to and including greater Timor, and anything
beyond as being the Pacific. From this point of view Indonesia can
realistically claim to Timor under a realist doctrine. Realism constitutes
order inside that territory.
Indonesia straddles both the Indian and Pacific
Oceans. In their way of thinking, Makasar fishermen were visiting
Australia long before any European settlers. From a maritime biological
perspective, Alfred Wallace identified the distinct differences
between mammals of the Malay Archipelago (Asia) and those of Australasia,
thus producing what is referred to as the Wallace Line.
This imaginary line runs between Borneo and Sulawesi,
well west of Timor. Australia uses the Wallace Line as a territorial
reference thereby supporting East Timor’s right to independence.
Indonesia, on the other hand, does not recognise this as legitimate.
Also Indonesia can argue the point of tectonic plates where the
Eurasia plate takes in Java, Bali, Timor, while the Australia plate
is south of all these islands.
In addition to these geographical lines of contention
East Timor’s colonial past cannot be forgotten. This would
play a major part in what was to follow. “On 25 April 1974
a coup in Lisbon toppled Portugal’s authoritarian regime.
The army officers that led the coup wanted to end the long-running
colonial wars that were crippling Portugal’s economy […]
Portuguese authorities encouraged the establishment of political
parties in East Timor”. In this regard a former colonial power
is keen to withdraw its claims over the territory in the name of
self-interest, a realism concept, due to a faltering economy.
Australian views can be summarised by Foreign Minister
Peacock’s conclusion in the matter of Indonesia’s pressure
on East Timor that, “It means that we must take into account
Indonesia’s view that East Timor is now part of Indonesia
and that this situation is not likely to change.” A year later,
Australia was the first and only country to formally acknowledge
Indonesia’s annexing of the territory. This could only serve
to enhance Indonesia’s resolve in regards its territorial
claims.
Territory pertains to any natural resources a state
may possess. Therefore, a substantial consideration for any state,
and motivations concerning both domestic and world affairs is that
of both trade and their dependence on resources. This has worked
in Indonesia’s favour considerably throughout these historical
events concerning East Timor.
Trade relates to export markets and thus economics.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country, Goldstein says is, “the
best single indicator of a state’s power” .
Of issues regarding resources, 2005 World Book
says:
“Indonesia is the world’s largest
exporter of liquefied natural gas. Oil and gas account for about
25 percent of Indonesia's total export earnings, down from more
than 80 percent in the early 1980’s. Indonesia belongs to
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
an association of countries whose economies depend heavily on
oil exports.”
This stands as an example of realism in so much
as a lack of action by the greater global community maintains the
status quo, in order to maintain trade in essential commodities.
The willingness to impinge on geopolitical issues relating to which
Indonesia deems part of their founding territory becomes a substantial
risk in trade of a significant resource, namely oil and gas, for
any potential trading partner.
To reinforce such state behaviours even further,
the Australian ambassador stated after five foreign journalists
were killed in the initial actions of Indonesian forces after the
Portuguese pullout:
“Although we know it is not true, the formal
position of the Indonesian Government is still that there is no
Indonesian military intervention in East Timor”; questioning
this ‘formal position’, he cautioned, ‘would invite
a hurt and angry reaction’.” Indonesia would simply
press its own interests without interference.
Pressures from local industry and commerce can only
help to influence a given state in regards these economic and trade
concerns, as it was with Australian oil companies.
“Oil interests in Australia had lobbied
strongly during 1975 in support of Indonesia’s actions in
the hope of ensuring their maritime presence in the Timor Sea.”
Present there were some five billion barrels of
oil, and ten thousand times the cubic feet in natural gas.
From a strategic point of view, no state wishes
to have contention within its borders. Naturally, as Indonesia deems
East Timor part of its sovereign territory there is a wish to ensure
no challenge, political or otherwise, is made. Translating overwhelming
military force into power, the state hoped they could negate any
such challenges. Also it serves as a witness to the state’s
ability to take care of its own affairs regionally.
Additionally, soft power in the form of negotiation
with other states has shown to allow Indonesia to maintain this
control and order, abet it precariously. For Australia, only 480
kilometres to the territory’s south, it stands as an assertion
of gunboat diplomacy. This Kegley defines as “a show of military
force […] to intimidate an adversary.” Australia, in
this case can be construed as a potential adversary who might oppose
the state’s desire to occupy East Timor.
Indonesia also found itself willing to bargain with
the US in regards the superpower’s strategic concerns for
right of passage for their submarines during the Cold War. This
assisted both parties to maintain a status quo, permitting Indonesia
to carry on with its own affairs concerning East Timor the way it
saw fit. Goldstein constitutes bargaining as two powers trying to
influence each other to their greatest respective advantage. All
of the major states involved have demonstrated this by their dealings
with each other throughout the course of the history of East Timor.
Material gain for Indonesia included military arms, assisting their
military practically in pressure against East Timorese resistance
in an ongoing counterinsurgency war.
The trade of arms by both the US and Britain in
1978 in fighter aircraft bolstered the Indonesian Air Force substantially.
From two major powers, the sale of aircraft could only be seen as
a sign of further legitimising Indonesia’s actions against
East Timor at that time. This shows how other state actors have
behaved to further their own interests. For the US and Britain it
is reflected in commercial profit for domestic firms.
The core principles of the realism paradigm can
be better seen and understood by the history of a country like Indonesia
and its actions in relation to territories like East Timor. Furthermore
the motivations of foreign powers in relation to this history can
be reinforced while analysing the issues from other angles. A nations’
lack of will to act in the face of massive human rights violations
can be rationalised, even if, on a moral and ethical level it is
reprehensible.
1999 presented an opposing situation for Indonesia
where, seeing their position in East Timor as untenable, an opportunity
to save face and also demonstrate a positive resolution on the world
stage, their military withdrew from the territory. East Timor’s
independence thereafter was quickly enacted after twenty-four years
of occupation.
With similar cases to be cited such as Aceh and
Papua (Irian Jaya), the history of Borneo and Malaya amongst others,
it can be surmised that such a large and culturally diverse country
such as Indonesia will continue to be challenged by the needs to
control its territories. Understandably those very basic justifications
presented here can stand as an rationale pertaining to issues that
are unlikely to vanish from world stage any time soon.
By Leon T. Harrison for INTP 113, Victoria University,
Wellington
Bibliography
2005 World Book The Software MacKiev Company,
Version 9.0.2.1
Crawford, J and Harper, G. (2001) Operation
East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor 1999-2001
Auckland: Reed Books
Goldstein, J and Pevehouse, J. (2006) International
Relations New York: Pearson Longman
Kegley, C. (2007) World Politics: Trend and
Transformation (11th ed.) Victoria: Thomson Wadsworth
Martinkus, J. (2001) A Dirty Little War
Australia: Random House Australia
Taylor, J. (1999) East Timor: The Price of Freedom
Australia: Pluto Press
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